The secession of the entire United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the EU is possible. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union expressly enables a member state to negotiate its secession with its soon-to-be ex-partners. But before, and until, that article is engaged, a constitutional pause is occurring. The new Prime Minister and her new cabinet, as well as their opponents, are reviewing their options. In doing so, they are fully conscious of the results of the advisory referendum of 23 June 2016. Of particular concern is the fact that Scotland and Northern Ireland are manifestly more enthusiastic about remaining in the EU than England and Wales are in wanting to leave. That presents May's government with a major challenge. May might also be vaguely aware of one abiding law of the EU: every referendum result that has been adverse to European integration has either been reversed through a subsequent referendum -or ignored.
1 A 52-48 outcome is eminently reversible, if not by May then by her successor (possibly from another party). The messier and costlier the withdrawal process, the more likely its reversal becomes. May has been emollient and reserved, but she has made commitments that may have far-reaching consequences. Her actions suggest tacit acknowledgment of the profound crisis of legitimacy that may follow if Article 50 is invoked without the consent of Scotland and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland's union with Great Britain is qualifi ed by a political settlement, in which an EUembedded Republic of Ireland is an institutional partner. UKexit would breach this 1998 agreement, which was ratifi ed by the peoples of both entities on the island in separate referendums. That settlement made Northern Ireland a federacy: a legal arrangement in which neither Northern Ireland nor Great Britain may unilaterally alter its constitutional relationship with the other (though provision is made for Irish reunifi cation).
2 But exactly such a step is now under contemplation: UKexit would be executed against the will of a local majority in Northern Ireland and against the will of the majority in the Northern Ireland Assembly. May's cabinet must explain why a referendum held in 2016 within the UK and Gibraltar should supersede or abrogate key features of the agreement ratifi ed by referendum in both parts of Ireland in 1998 (and ratifi ed in a treaty registered at the United Nations, which affects not one but two member states of the EU. 
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May's cabinet also has to refl ect on the possible damage to recent arrangements agreed with Scotland that would fl ow from UKexit. It would reverse express commitments given when Scotland voted in a referendum in 2014 to remain within the UK. The referendum result represents a material change in Scotland's status, within both its unions. The prospect now exists that Scotland could be taken out of the EU against the will of its people. May's early moves suggest she will consult with Scotland and Northern Ireland over UKexit, but one might interpret them as suggesting that she is deliberately granting both countries a tacit veto over any exit strategy from the EU.
The organization of exiting from the EU has been assigned by May to prominent Conservatives who sought to leave the EU (David Davis, Liam Fox and Boris Johnson). Folly or cunning? No one knows whether these Leavers can reach an agreement with their cabinet colleagues on the best way to leave the EU, or on the UK's best future relationship with the EU (if any). If these "Brexiteers" persuade the cabinet to pursue a defi nite plan -advised by a civil service that was unprepared for a Leave result -they then have to ensure that their agreed exit strategy can survive the House of Commons and Lords (in which "Remain" majorities still exist). And all of this has to occur before the Brexiteers know whether their plan (and accompanying contingency plans) can survive at the negotiating tables with the massed ranks of the EU member states.
May's assignment to her Brexiteer colleagues is therefore exceptionally diffi cult. Her assurances to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland have compounded their problems. Since May appears to be prepared to concede to Sturgeon full consultation on unfolding proposals to exit -to head off a possible referendum in Scotland to leave the UK -any strategy for leaving the EU will have to result in a relationship that is as close as possible to the existing EU membership in order to persuade Sturgeon and her colleagues to co-operate. However, such a "soft exit" might not satisfy Conservative or UKIP voters.
